Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 7, Number 3

2011

Article 7

Environmental Audit Policy
Mark L. Manewitz∗

∗

Copyright c 2011 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr

ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT POLICY
Mark L. Manewitz,
Vicki J. Isler,
and Nancy R. Westphal*

I. INTRODUCTION

T

he complexity of environmental regulations has outpaced even
the most sophisticated environmental lawyers and engineers.
The chemical industry looks to the legal profession for guidance
and advice in complying with a tapestry of laws and rules which
today rival the Tax Code in length and complexity.' The peculiar
progression of environmental compliance has created the need to
assess facilities before advising clients of the possible impact of
relevant regulations on them. Indeed, assessments are now an invaluable prerequisite to the professional advice needed by industry
for compliance and/or remediation.' Moreover, these audits make
good business sense because they reduce violations and thereby
reduce penalties. At the same time, audits improve the environment
and provide data for management that can help in the strategic

* Mark Manewitz, Esq., is a partner at the law firm of Friedman
Siegelbaum. Vicki Isler, Esq., is of counsel to Friedman Siegelbaum. Nancy
Westphal is an associate at Friedman Siegelbaum.
1. See Stephen Mansfield & Everett Seymour, Phase I Environmental Assessments After the ASTM Standards, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 18, Sept./Oct. 1993
(advancing that "[tihe legal and factual complexity of... [environmental audits]
may require not only that an environmental consultant perform an assessment...
but that the businessman and the lawyer become actively involved in deciding
what unusual or complex risk issues should be addressed.").
2. See James R. Arnold, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities To Government Agencies and Third Parties, CA47 ALI-ABA 381, 383 (Oct. 12, 1995)
(remarking on the growing significance of environmental audits). See also Michael Baram, The New Environment for Protecting Corporate Information, 25
ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 545, 545 (July 22, 1994) (articulating that the new corporate
culture "involves extensive auditing of hazardous activities and products, using
the findings to correct and prevent regulatory violations and minimize liability
risks").
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planning process.' Yet, these very same assessments and audits
can, sometimes, provide the government with notice of non-compliance and the means for sanctioning regulated industries for violations of environmental laws and regulations.4
An environmental audit is a mechanism that businesses utilize to
reduce the risk of failing to comply with environmental rules and
regulations. Such a mechanism facilitates an understanding of the
regulatory environment in which the business operates and identifies those areas where additional attention or alternative approaches
are needed.
To use this tool effectively, however, one must first ascertain the
goals of conducting an environmental audit. Goals must be matched
with the type of business involved. A business must also recognize
that undertaking an audit is not without risk. This Article will focus
on the different types of environmental audits that are available for
businesses, will identify the pros and cons of conducting an audit,
and will provide guidance for designing an environmental audit
program. This Article will conclude with a discussion of the growing trend towards providing some form of privilege for environmental audits.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS
The goals of an environmental audit dictate the type of audit and
the level of detail required in that audit. A business usually undertakes an environmental audit to establish a compliance profile, to
address plant processes and efficiency, and, more often than not, to
identify or test some potential improvements in these processes. A

3. See Howard N. Aspen, Integrated Environmental, Health and Safety Audits as a Risk Management Tool, 1 ENVTL. STRATEGIES REAL EST. 1 (June 1994)
(asserting that "[a]udits help minimize risk by assessing, monitoring, and controlling potential legal and financial liabilities.").
4. See Paula C. Murray, The Environmental Self-Audit Privilege: Growing
Movement in the States Nixed by EPA, 24 REAL ESTATE L.J. 169 (Fall 1995).
The author points out that corporations are concerned that environmental audits
may provide a paper trail for regulatory agencies to follow in investigating criminal culpability and assessing costly clean-up fines, id. at 169, but warns the regulated community to view the environmental audit as an integral part of corporate
policy. Id. See also John T. Kolaga, Are Environmental Audit Reports Protected
by Legal Privilege? 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 54 (Winter 1995).
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business may also conduct an audit in anticipation of a sale or a
change in use or ownership of the company or of the company's
facilities.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") defines an environmental audit as a "systematic, documented, periodic and objective review [ ] by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements." 5 Thus, an
audit is essentially a mechanism by which a company gathers information about its operations. An audit reveals how a company or its
facilities may impact the environment and human health. It also
identifies the company's risk of liability for failing to comply with
applicable rules and regulations. Hence, the audit includes both
incriminatory and exculpatory information which could be problematic because it may serve as admissions or as evidence against the
company in future litigation. Without an appropriate privilege for
an environmental audit, concerns over the future use of information
gathered during the audit create a disincentive for business to conduct audits. Additionally, the facility's location, its state as well as
its county, impacts how an environmental audit is constructed and
whether a privilege to protect information gathered during the audit
exists. These risks, and the fact that audits are an essential and
desired tool for business, have motivated legislative interest in an
effective and meaningful privilege for environmental audits.6

5. EPA Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004,
25,006 (1986). The policy statement further provides that "[e]nvironmental auditing includes a variety of compliance assessment techniques which go beyond
those legally required and are used to identify actual and potential environmental
problems." Id. at 25,004.
6. Thirty-four states introduced legislation in 1995 to protect the results of
corporate environmental audits from disclosure. Cheryl Hogue, Audit Legislation
Gains in States, But Some Predict Slowdown in Future, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA)

882, 882 (Sept. 1, 1995). Nine of the bills passed, bringing the number of states
who currently have environmental audit privilege statutes to fourteen. For a complete list of the states having passed such statutes, see discussion infra part IV.H.
Additionally, EPA launched a pilot program in 1994 to encourage audits through
a limited environmental audit privilege. E.P.A. Note to Correspondents, 94-R-147
(June 20, 1994). Anyone contemplating conducting an audit should consider the
potential detrimental use of the audit or information developed and design a
program that can protect the information, to the extent possible, during the audit
program and thereafter.
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A. Compliance Profiles
One central purpose of almost every environmental audit is to
identify the areas where the business's operations may trigger compliance problems. Most emissions or discharges into the air, water
or ground, especially in ways that would leak into groundwater,
will trigger some form of regulatory compliance requirement Reporting and recordkeeping obligations are substantial for those
companies that handle any material defined as a hazardous waste, a
hazardous material or a hazardous substance A compliance audit
identifies violations and potential violations of these rules and recommends programs which will either prevent future compliance
problems or will correct existing ones. The benefit of conducting
this type of audit is that it puts a company in a position to insure
regulatory compliance. However, the concern is that by conducting
an audit a company will have created a database that regulators,
private citizen groups, and competitors can use against the busi9
ness.
Several states have now created enforcement agencies and adopted a variety of environmental audit privileges.'0 The availability of

7. See, e.g., Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, Federal
Water Pollution Control Act §§ 101-607 (1994); Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q, CAA §§ 101-618 (1994).
8. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 6924 (s), Solid Waste Discovery Act § 3004 (1994).
9. See James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for
Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 126-27 (1994) (footnote
omitted) (noting the recognition by courts of "a 'chilling effect' on the frankness
of environmental audits when they are compelled to be disclosed in litigation").
10. See Environment-Audit Privilege Puts Corporate Interests First, 140
N.J.L.J., June 5, 1995, at 29 (noting that at least nine states, including Arkansas,
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oregon, Virginia and Wyoming have passed environmental audit privileges that "encourage companies to
make more aggressive efforts to analyze and improve their environmental performance"); State Audit Legislation Could Cause Programs to Revert to EPA,
Browner Says, DAiLY ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Mar. 28, 1995) (reporting that beginning with Oregon in 1993, twelve states have adopted some type of environmental audit statute and "nearly every other state in the union is considering bills on
environmental audits"); States Taking Legislative Initiative in Encouraging Corporate Audits, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Mar. 15, 1995) (asserting that in 1994
Colorado, Kentucky and Indiana were the first states to adopt aggressive audit
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a privilege, and a business's ability to rely upon this privilege, must
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. In anticipation of litigation,
counsel may ask that a business complete a specific type of audit,
at least in part which, under appropriate circumstances, can be
protected by the attorney-client privilege under federal and state
laws of evidence. Anyone contemplating an audit under these circumstances must, with the assistance of counsel, check the state
and federal law regarding the privilege to ensure that the audit is
undertaken in a way that protects it.
A compliance audit should identify the regulatory requirements
for the business, determine whether the business is in compliance
with these requirements at a particular point in time, and assess the
cost to the business to comply with these requirements. This enables the business to develop a strategy which will either bring the
business into compliance or ensure the business's continued compliance with applicable laws, rules and regulations.
B. Plant ProcessImprovement Audits
The second type of audit, the plant process improvement audit,
allows a company and its management or reengineering team to
identify areas where cost savings and risk reduction can occur.
Preventing pollution, reducing risk of non-compliance, promoting
cost-effective growth, identifying risks, and reductions of those
risks constitute the goals of a plant process improvement audit. This
audit impacts the availability of insurance, identifies the permits
that must be modified or are necessary for continued operation, and
allows a manager to have the tools to control costs, decide whether
changes in processes are needed, readjust staffing in the current era

privilege laws and "[in most state capitols throughout the nation, lawmakers are
sponsoring bills that would encourage businesses to review facilities and operations candidly, without fear of self-incrimination if they find and correct violations"). See also Governor Signs Bill to Provide Limited Protectionfor Self-Audits, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Apr. 11, 1995) (stating that Mississippi Governor Kirk Fordice signed legislation creating a limited self-evaluation privilege
aimed at encouraging facilities to voluntarily conduct environmental audits). But
see States Taking Legislative Initiative in Encouraging CorporateAudits, DAILY
ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Mar. 15, 1995) (stating that environmental audit privilege
bills died in Hawaii and West Virginia).
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of downsizing, and improve the business's ability to budget. Again,
before going forward with this type of audit, the ability to protect
this data should be explored.
C. Acquisition Or Divestiture Audits
The acquisition or divestiture audit is typically conducted in
anticipation of a sale or a change in ownership. A business conducts an acquisition audit to establish a baseline for potential problems at the facility, thus preventing future liability. The audit may
also be used to help businesses working toward an acquisition
address potential liabilities and indemnities. Because an acquisition
is usually done for strategic purposes, an acquisition audit may also
help both parties identify whether the facility will be a good "fit"
and will meet the identified purpose of the acquiring company.
An acquisition audit should focus on the existing plant -- whether
a history of environmental violations exists as well as the potential
for prospective environmental liability. Issues ranging from on-site
and off-site disposal practices to the target company's failure to
obtain necessary permits or permit modifications can trigger liability.1 Thus, an audit must explore each of these areas of concern.
The question of privilege for potentially damaging information
remains an issue to be negotiated.
An acquisition audit identifies and reduces the risk of liability to
individuals while promoting compliance. Such an audit should
explore whether liability could potentially extend beyond a
company's normal corporate structure. Failure to comply with environmental laws, especially for small companies that do not honor
the corporate form, may expose the principals who make the environmental compliance decisions to personal liability. 2 Furthermore, the "enterprise" that continues to reap the benefits of noncompliance may also be subject to liability. 3 An acquisition audit
identifies and reduces the risk of liability to individuals while promoting compliance.
11. See, e.g., RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925(q), SWDA § 3005 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Kelley Ex Rel. Michigan Natural Resources Comm'n v. Arco
Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
13. See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir.

1991).
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In addition to statutory liability, an acquisition audit identifies
common law claims in the acquisition context such as negligence,
nuisance, material misrepresentation, fraud, trespass, strict liability,
toxic tort, citizens', or attorney general actions which might be
brought against the plant and its owner. An acquisition audit catalogs and quantifies the risk of these types of liability and allows
parties to allocate liability in the acquisition process.
III. PARTICIPATION IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS

An audit identifies the issues that a new business should evaluate.
A recent survey of Business and Industry Associations across the
country indicated that companies that have conducted environmental audits have identified the key legislative and regulatory issues
that will affect their business and, as a result, participate in the
future legislative and regulatory decision-making processes. 4 Audits afford companies data and insight thus allowing them to meaningfully bring their concerns into the political and regulatory process.
No matter what type of audit one contemplates, the benefits of
conducting a thoughtful audit must be weighed against the risk of
inertia. 5 The availability of an audit privilege and the federal

14. The Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey of U.S. Businesses, March
1995, Price Waterhouse LLP. According to the survey "U.S. companies say they
would conduct more environmental audits if they were assured that the results
would not be used to penalize them." Id. The survey also revealed that among
auditing companies, nine percent (9%) had audit findings involuntarily discovered
and twelve percent (12%) had voluntarily disclosed findings used against them.
See also Elimination of Penalties Could Boost Environmental Self-Auditing, Survey Says, INT'L ENV'T DAILY (Apr. 24, 1995); Most Government Agencies Do
Not Conduct Environmental Audits, GAO Finds, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) (May
8, 1995) (citing the General Accounting Office's Finding that with the exception
of the military and Energy Department, most federal agencies do not undertake
environmental audits of agency operations). But see Companies Conducting Audits Despite Lack of Privilege Laws, Lawyer Says, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA)
(Apr. 28, 1995) (citing an official from the National Association of Attorney
Generals who claims that "[c]ompanies increasingly are conducting environmental
audits, despite the lack of legal protections treating audit results as privileged
information.").
15. See David Sive & Daniel Riesel, The EPA and Some State Legislatures
Weigh Strengthening the Self-CriticalAnalysis Privilege so as to Promote Candor
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government's position on audit privilege viability are essential to
this analysis. The corporate actor must base its decision on a balance of risks.
IV. RISKS OF AUDITING
A. ProsecutorialUse of Self-Assessments
The often close question of who has knowledge of compliance
violations separates criminal violations of the law from civil violations. 6 A prosecutor's discretion in choosing between civil or
criminal prosecution often turns on the strength of proof of knowledge. In this situation, an audit or self-assessment could demonstrate such knowledge. Thus, the stakes are high for industrial clients in the ongoing debate in New Jersey, 7 Washington D.C., and
throughout the country, as Congress, the EPA, and state legislatures
consider privilege statutes to protect environmental audits.
B. The Threat to Efficient Prosecutions
Similarly, the stakes are high for EPA, the Justice Department,
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
("NJDEP"), and many environmental agencies around the nation as
their ability to enforce environmental laws is impaired by "privilege" statutes.' 8 Any diminution of law enforcement's ability to
obtain evidence of intent of criminal conduct undercuts the protec-

in Audits, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 13, 1995, at B4 (discussing employment of outside

counsel by companies to ensure that evidentiary privileges can be asserted to
protect the information from discovery if the company comes under investigation).
16. United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995) (discussing the knowledge requirement for a felony
conviction under the Clean Water Act). See also David S. Krakoff & Fred R.
Wagner, Advising Clients in the Post-Weitzenhoff Era: The Courts Expand Scope
of Environmental Crimes, 10 CRIM. JUST. 10 (Fall 1995) (discussing the impact
of even limited knowledge of environmental problems on corporate liability).
17. New Jersey has, after much debate, passed a limited audit privilege (Bill
S. 384). The bill allows the Attorney General to obtain the audit under certain
circumstances. See discussion infra part IV.G.
18. See Linda A. Spahr, Environmental Self-Audit Privilege: The Straw That
Breaks the Back of Criminal Prosecutions,7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 635 (1996).
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tion of the public. 9 The privilege for self-assessment and audits is
viewed suspiciously by law enforcement agencies (especially the
EPA) as a potential shield to prevent enforcement of the environmental laws.2"
C. Background Court Decisions
To encourage environmental audits, some federal courts have
held that environmental audit reports are privileged, and are not
subject to discovery in litigation.2 This reasoning emerged from
Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc.22 The Bredice line of cases en-

19.. See Craig N. Johnston, An Essay on Environmental Audit Privileges: The
Right Problem, The Wrong Solution, 25 ENVTL. L. 335, 337 (Spring 1995) (concluding that the "EPA should take immediate steps to preempt the audit-privilege
movement by providing an alternative scheme that better balances the competing
goals of vigorous enforcement and encouraging compliance-assurance activities.").
20. See EPA Policy Offers No Audit Privilege; Lack of Prosecution, Punitive
Fines Possible, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Apr. 3, 1995) (reporting that the EPA
"would not grant immunity from penalties to those who audit, remedy violations,
and report the wrongdoings voluntarily" because the agency wants "'to preserve a
level playing field' in which violators do not gain a competitive advantage.").
21. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
22. 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Bredice involved a medical malpractice suit in which plaintiff sought to discover
documents pertaining to medical staff reviews. Id. at 249-50. Defendant hospital
argued that such documents were privileged on public policy grounds and the
court agreed stating that "[t]here is an overwhelming public interest in having
those staff meetings held on a confidential basis so that the flow of ideas and
advice can continue unimpeded." Id. at 250-51.
The reasoning in Bredice is similar to that of an earlier decision by the
Fifth Circuit, Southern Railway Company v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir.
1968), which held that public policy mandated a railroad's accident reports be
immune from discovery because "[aibsent complete and honest reports, effective
accident evaluation may be impaired and the prevention of future accidents hampered."
Since the Bredice decision, the self-critical analysis privilege has been
widely recognized by courts in the context of medical peer reviews and most
states have enacted statutes protecting medical peer reviews from discovery.
Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
Additionally, the privilege has been broadened to apply in numerous non-medical
contexts. See Bradley v. Melroe Co., 141 F.R.D. 1, 2-3 (D.D.C. 1992) (extending
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courages peer reviews in the medical profession by protecting materials generated during the review with the self-critical analysis
privilege.23 In September 1994, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Florida granted Reichhold Chemicals a qualified privilege for "retrospective analyses of past conduct, practices,
and occurrences, and the resulting environmental consequences." 4
self-critical analysis privilege to products liability contexts); Keyes v. Lenoir
Rhyne College, 552 F.2d 579, 581 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 904
(1977) (applying the privilege to academic peer reviews); In re Crazy Eddie Sec.
Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the privilege to internal review of compliance with securities laws); Granger v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (finding the privilege applicable
to railroad accident investigative reports); Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273, 1276
(N.J. Super. 1984) (applying the privilege to discovery of corporate accident
reports of employee injuries); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626,
631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding the privilege applicable to protect a newspaper's
documents regarding its affirmative action practices); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (recognizing the privilege where a defense contractor assessed compliance with equal employment opportunity regulations). There has been considerable support of the self-critical analysis in law
journals. See Joseph E. Murphy & Roselee M. Oyer, Securities Litigation: The
Self-Evaluative Privilege and Beyond, CAl 10 ALI-ABA 423, 425 (1995) (suggesting unlimited immunity for self-evaluative documents); Robert J. Bush, Stimulating Corporate Self-Regulation--The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege:
ParadigmaticPreferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U. L. REv. 597
(1993); David Beck, Business Litigation, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 356 (1993); David P.
Leonard, Codifying a Privilegefor Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
113 (1988); Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 255 (1987). But see
James F. Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilegefor Self-Critical Analyses, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 551, 551 (1983) (footnote omitted) (arguing "[a]ny new
privilege runs counter to the current strong judicial trend towards restricting evidentiary privileges and is inconsistent with the existing broad scope of permissible discovery.").
23. 50 F.R.D. at 251. The Bredice court articulated:
Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua
non of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional
necessity, would result in terminating such deliberations. Constructive
professional criticism cannot occur in an atmosphere that one doctor's
suggestion will be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in
a malpractice suit.
Id. at 250.
24. Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 527 (N.D. Fla.
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The privilege applied "only to reports which were prepared after
the fact for the purpose of candid self-evaluation and analysis of
the cause and effect of past pollution, and of Reichhold's possible
role ... in contributing to the pollution at the site." 5
Judicial acceptance of the critical self-evaluation privilege in the
environmental context has been mixed.26 A district court in the
Third Circuit held that "the self-evaluation privilege does not apply
a fortiori to environmental reports, records, and memoranda. 2 7 In
1994). The Reichhold court explained that the self-critical analysis privilege "allows individuals or businesses to candidly assess their compliance with regulatory
and legal requirements without creating evidence that may be used against them
by their opponents in future litigation. The rationale for the doctrine is that such
critical self-evaluation fosters the compelling state interest in observance of the
law." Id. at 524.
25. Id. at 527. The Florida district court further qualified the self-critical
analysis privilege by asserting that the privilege could be overcome by a
defendant's demonstration of "extraordinary circumstances or special need[s]." Id.
Other courts have similarly recognized limitations in applying the privilege. See
Bradley, 141 F.R.D. at 3 (applying the self-critical analysis privilege to "discovery of impressions, opinions, and evaluations" but requiring disclosure if moving
party demonstrates substantial need); Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628
F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding the privilege inapplicable where a government agency subpoenas documents); Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d at 1273, 1278
(N.J. Supr. 1984) (refusing to apply the privilege to factual information); Robert
v. National Detroit Corp., 87 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (excepting data
and statistical information from the scope of the privilege); Gillman v. United
States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (asserting that the privilege did not
extend to factual information).
26. In an article by Peter Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege & Environmental Audit Reports, 25 ENVTL. L. 73, 85-6 (Winter 1995) (footnote omitted), the author surmises that
It]he reluctance among federal judges to recognize a privilege of selfcritical analysis stems in part from a realization that the privilege,
although appealing in theory, is very difficult to apply in praclice .... Moreover, federal judges have had difficulty balancing the
policy of ensuring open and complete disclosure of all relevant facts
against the public interest in shielding self-evaluations in order to
further socially recognized goals.
Id. See also James Moore & Perkins Cole, Audit Privilege and Voluntary Disclosure: Is There Any Protection Against Prosecution?, CA05 ALI-ABA 39,
40-41 (1995) (outlining the development of privilege protecting environmental
audits).
27. Koppers Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 847 F. Supp. 360, 364
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New Jersey, it is doubtful that a federal court would recognize a
critical self-evaluative privilege in the environmental context because New Jersey District Courts have not embraced Bredice, even
in the medical peer review context.28
D. EPA's Interim Audit Policy
Both Congress and EPA recognize the need to provide some
protection to conscientious corporate actors who conduct environmental audits. On April 3, 1995, EPA announced an interim policy
regarding environmental audits.29 Accordingly, EPA has announced that it will not make criminal referrals and will reduce

(W.D. Pa. 1994). The Koppers court further asserted that, following this decision,
corporations would not "face a Hobson's choice between the due diligence and
self-incrimination in the tightly-regulated environmental context, for that context
requires strict attention to environmental affairs." Id. The district court expressed
doubt that the decision would result in potential polluters avoiding environmental
diligence obligations for fear that such documentation will be used against them
in the future. Id. But cf. James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The
Need for Legislative Recognition, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 119 (1994).
O'Reilly argues that "critical self-examination of the weaknesses of facilities ...
leads to positive changes ... but it results in an audit document that can help
outsiders to prosecute ... corporation[s]" and when faced with the choice "between effective candor and circumspect risk avoidance, some companies are
foregoing the benefits of environmental self-audits in an effort to avoid future
confrontations over the content of these reports." Id.
28. See Wei v. Bodner, 127 F.R.D. 91, 98 (D.N.J. 1989). The Wei court reasoned that although New Jersey statutory law protects information obtained
through hospital utilization review committees, the privilege is limited. Id. (citing
N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.8 (Supp. 1988)). After balancing the policies supporting the
privilege and the policies underlying the antitrust laws in issue, the district court
held that disclosure was appropriate. Id. at 98-99.
On February 5, 1996, the New Jersey State Senate voted unanimously to
provide incentives for businesses to perform voluntary evidentiary audits. Bill
Promoting EnvironmentalAudits Advances, STATE ENV'T DAILY (BNA) (Feb. 15,
1996). Such incentives included limiting the access of enforcement agencies to
audit information. Id. The Senate, however, provided several exceptions to the
confidentiality, including situations in which confidentiality is shown to be outweighed by the public interest and instances in which the entity did not take steps
to correct environmental violations discovered through an audit. Id.
29. EPA Voluntary Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995) [hereinafter EPA Interim Policy].
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civil penalties for corporate actors who discover violations through
a voluntary environmental audit, provided that the actor voluntarily
discloses and corrects the violation, remediates the harm, prevents
further occurrences, and cooperates with EPA.3" Additionally, the
violation must not have resulted from "fail[ure] to take appropriate
steps to avoid repeat or recurring violations .. .. "31 Whether this

additional requirement is merely a backstop to allow EPA to continue past enforcement policies remains to be seen. However, EPA
pos ulates that the new policy will provide an incentive for companies to conduct environmental audits. Under the new policy, EPA
will stop making routine requests for voluntary environmental audit
reports to trigger civil or criminal investigations.3"
EPA's interim policy is a step in the direction sought by industry.: Yet, for industry, it does not go far enough.34 The key

30. Id. at 16,877.
31. Id.
32. Id.
3:3. On December 18, 1995, EPA issued its final policy relating to an entity's
privilege against disclosure of self-audit reports. See Incentives for Self-Policing:
Discovery Disclosure, Correction & Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg.
66,706 (1995). Commentators have found, however, that the policy did not pronounce concrete protection to companies from disclosure of self-audits. Id. The
National Law Journal reported that the revisions to the audit policy attempted to
promote "a higher standard of self-policing by providing incentives to companies
that perform voluntary self-evaluations and disclose and correct the violations."
Id. (footnote omitted). The article further explained that
[u]nder the final policy, when an entity discovers a violation through a
voluntary environmental audit or compliance management system that
demonstrates a certain level of due diligence; discloses the violation
within ten days ... corrects the violations and remedies any...
harm... within sixty days ... and agrees... to take steps to prevent the recurrence of the violation; and fully cooperates with the
EPA, the EPA will eliminate the punitive component of the penalty
known as the "gravity-based penalty."
Id. (footnote omitted).
34. See also Lynn Bergeson, EPA's Voluntary Auditing Policy is Final, But
Not Definitive, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, p.32 (Mar. 1996) (stating that EPA's new
policy does little to clarify the scope of a company's privilege from disclosure of
self-auditing materials); Marianne Lavelle, Companies Seek More EPA Leeway,
NAT'L L. J., p.A12 (Feb. 26, 1996) (espousing that "[e]ven though the Clinton
Administration has put into place a moderate new policy to ease the punishment
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failing of EPA's interim policy is that it only protects the would-be
auditor from prosecutorial actions by EPA. Even this protection
may be fleeting; EPA has stated that it reserves the right to rescind
the interim policy.35 The policy is insufficient, as it stands, to assure those corporate actors who might conduct environmental audits
that they are safe from future prosecution.
Further, the policy does not protect environmental audit reports
from discovery by third parties, such as toxic tort plaintiffs or noncooperative potentially responsible parties.36 EPA's position is that
the alternative, a legislatively-created privilege, will be used by
lawbreakers to gain economic advantage and to create costly litigation.37 Its rationale for the policy is that it will "level the economic
playing field" by collecting penalties for economic benefits reaped
by parties that do not report violations.38 Of course, EPA's internal
calculation of economic benefits will also eventually become the
subject of litigation.
E. FederalLegislation
EPA's ostensibly conciliatory stance on the audit issue is undoubtedly prompted by proposed federal legislation which is expected to create a strong audit privilege. The House version, introduced by Representative Hefley, is known as the "Voluntary Environmental Self-Evaluation Act" and provides a qualified privilege
for audit materials and substantial immunity for voluntary disclosures of violations.39 The Senate version, introduced by Senator
Hatfield, is known as the Voluntary Environmental Audit Protection
Act ("VEAPA").40 VEAPA exempts voluntary environmental audits from both discovery and admissibility in any administrative,
civil or criminal action before a federal court or agency, or under a

of corporations that uncover their own environmental violations, momentum is
building for more sweeping federal and state laws against use of the paper trial of
pollution in courts").
35. EPA Interim Policy, supra note 29, at 16,878.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. H.R. 1047 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
40. S. 582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3801 (1995).
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federal law.4 To protect against the abuses predicted by EPA,
VEAPA exempts reports made and/or required by regulatory agencies and information gained from independent sources.42 The holder of the privilege may expressly waive the privilege.43 If the privilege is asserted for fraudulent reasons, or if the privilege is used to
shield ongoing and continuing non-compliance with federal environnental laws, it may be waived implicitly." Disclosures under
VEAPA are considered voluntary (even if the resultant information
must be disclosed to EPA) so long as compliance measures are
undertaken and further relevant information is provided to appropriate regulatory agencies.45 Finally, VEAPA provides for in camera
reviews if the party seeking disclosure can show that the privilege
is being abused.'
F. EPA's Reaction to VEAPA

EPA is opposed to VEAPA and has stated that it will more closely scrutinize enforcement in states with audit privileges.47 Suggesting that a privilege would undermine the trust between industry and
government, EPA Assistant Administrator Steven Herman has noted
that "when
it comes to audits, 'we trust you' to do the right
9,48
thing,
and "[in turn, companies have to "trust us to use good
' Not only does EPA rely on
judgment."49
the "trust me, I'm from
the government" rationale, but it also relies on a report by Price
Waterhouse, LLP in which 75% of responding businesses indicated
that they had some type of environmental auditing policy, despite
the absence of privilege protections."

41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
S. 582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3801 (1995).
Id.
EPA Interim Policy, supra note 29, at 16,878.
Markets and Management Enforcement: Execs Skeptical about EPA's

Audit Policy, AM. POL. NETWORK GREENWIRE, May 15, 1995, available in

LEXIS, NEXIS Library, GRNWRE File.
49. Id.
50. See Elimination of Penalties Could Boost Environmental Self-Auditing,

Survey Says, INT'L ENV'T DAILY, Apr. 24, 1995, at d4.
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EPA's concern about VEAPA is not completely tenable. After a
1994 Colorado bill5 was enacted, several Colorado companies
voluntarily came forward to discuss their environmental problems
with state regulators. 2 Moreover, the fall back privilege used by
many companies is the attorney-client privilege. 3 This privilege is
unnecessarily expensive and occasionally ineffective, because it
requires (i) the costly use of attorneys; and (ii) that privileged information is only shared with high level management, i.e., the "control
group."54 The Price Waterhouse report disclosed that more audits
would be performed, if the contents of the reports were guaranteed
to be confidential.55
G. The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege in New Jersey
In a recent suit in New Jersey Superior Court to recover environ-

mental cleanup costs from its general liability insurers, CPC International, Inc. ("CPC") claimed the self-critical analysis privilege
in response to discovery requests.56 The court evaluated whether

51. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-25-126.5 (1), (3) (West 1994 & 1996
Supp.).
52. Viki Reath, Audit Law Author Calls Confidentiality Essential, ENV'T WK.
(Info. Access Co.), May 4, 1995, available in LEXIS, MARKET Library,
IACNWS File.
53. For a discussion of the attorney-client privilege in environmental audits,
see Michael H. Levin et al., Discovery and Disclosure: How to Protect Your
Environmental Audit Report, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1606 (Jan. 7, 1994).
54. But see Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981) (stating that
the narrow "control group" test was too narrow and would frustrate the privilege
by discouraging communication of information by employees, but failing to provide any rules to govern the privilege outside of the control group test).
55. See The Voluntary EnvironmentalAudit Survey of U.S. Businesses, March
1995, Price Waterhouse LLP.
56. CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462 (N.J.
Super. 1992). This was a case of first impression for the court, in that the court
had never reviewed the application of the self-critical analysis privilege in the
environmental context. Id. CPC argued that the privilege of self-critical analysis
protected the documents because. (1) the documents were "products of internal
evaluations;" (2) confidentiality of the documents promoted "internal availability
of such information;" and (3) "such evaluations would terminate in the future if
such results were disclosed." Id. at 464. The insurers, in response, contended that
the privilege did not apply to the documents because: (1) "the inspections and
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the public need for disclosure was outweighed by the public need
for confidentiality.57 While acknowledging that in certain instances
the privilege might exist, the Court rejected CPC's claim of privilege, stating, "this court cannot ignore the clear direction of the
New Jersey Legislature and condone the use of a privilege which
would be contrary to both the legislative intent in enacting environmental regulations and the liberal discovery policy which exists
in this state."58
Like EPA, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection recognized that complete judicial rejection of any self-critical
analysis privilege in the environmental context tends to: (i) discourage voluntary audits; and (ii) raise the possibility of a legislatively
created privilege with stronger provisions than would be contained
in any NJDEP policy. Seeking to mitigate the harsh dilemma
audits contained therein were conducted in the ordinary course of business;" (2)
there was "no public need for confidentiality regarding the documents;" and (3)
the documents were "absolutely necessary in order to determine coverage since
the information contained therein ... [could not] be obtained from other sources." id.
57. Id. at 464-65. The court proceeded to analyze the facts of the case under a
three part inquiry crafted in Wylie v. Mills, 478 A.2d 1273 (N.J. Super. 1984), in
which the New Jersey Superior Court submitted three criteria for application of
the self-critical analysis privilege:
(1) the information which is the subject of a production request must
be the criticisms or evaluations or the product of an evaluation or
critique conducted by the party opposing the production request; (2)
the "public need for confidentiality" of such analysis must be such
that the unfettered internal availability of such information should be
encourage as a matter of public policy; and (3) the analysis or evaluation must be of the character which would result in the termination of
such self-evaluative inquiries or critical input in future situations if
this information is subject to disclosure." Id. at 465.
58. Id. at 467. The court further maintained that:
the emphasis must be on the existence of strong environmental legislation as evidence of the compelling interest the public has in its
regulation.. . The public interest in preventing and remediating environmental pollution weighs heavily in favor of disclosure, even when
the government is not a party ... the public need for disclosure of
documents relating to environmental pollution and the circumstances
of such pollution outweighs the public's need for confidentiality in
such documents.
Id.
59. Marlen Dooley, Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement for the DEP,
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faced by corporate actors, the NJDEP has announced its intent to
publish a policy which "would ordinarily waive or substantially reduce civil and administrative penalties for violations discovered as
a result of an environmental audit."' NJDEP will follow this policy only if corporate actors voluntarily disclose and correct violations.61 Such violations may not be the result of intentional or
criminal conduct.6 2 The level of scienter needed for the conduct to
be considered "intentional" will be addressed during rule-making
sessions, but it is likely to include negligent, reckless, or intentional
conduct resulting in a statutory violation.
Like the EPA, the NJDEP is concerned that a legislative privilege
would be abused as a shield by corporate actors.6 3 One bill in the
New Jersey Assembly and both bills in the New Jersey Senate'
expressly provide for an audit privilege. As in their federal counter-

Address to Assembly Rules and Policy Committee (Mar. 27, 1995) [hereinafter M.

Dooley Address] (on file with the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection). Mr. Dooley proffered that:
[miany entities may elect not to perform environmental audits and
[choose] to remain ignorant of environmental problems if they believe
that the enforcement response will be the same whether they identify
and correct the problem themselves or the violations are identified
during a routine compliance inspection performed by the department.
If the threat of sanctions causes regulated entities to conclude that
they have little to gain and much to lose by identifying their own
compliance problems, then our enforcement program is not working
well.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. In his address to the Assembly Rules and Policy Committee, Mr. Dooley
cautioned the committee that although the privilege's intent is to "encourage
companies to act responsibly" some companies may abuse it by using the privilege to "shield themselves from liability for past and continuing violations." M.
Dooley Address, supra note 59.
64. New Jersey Senate Bill 1797 was introduced February 9, 1995 by Senator
MaclInnes and is identical to Assembly Bill 2521 introduced on the same date by
Assemblymen Bateman, Doria, Digaetano, Impreveduto and Pascrell. Senate Bill
1891 was introduced on March 13, 1995 by Senator McNamara and contains
similar provisions. The bill was substantially revised, reducing the level of privilege if certain conditions exist.
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part., VEAPA,65 the environmental audit privilege proposed by
these New Jersey bills would protect audit data from discovery by
third parties and contain provisions such as in camera hearings
while allowing for the government to obtain the audit information
should certain conditions be met.' Recognition of the usefulness
of audits is not only found in the privilege bill itself, but also in its
incorporation in other proposed environmental legislation.
H. Other States
New Jersey is not the first state to consider the audit privilege
issue. In 1993, Oregon6 7 enacted the first environmental audit privilege law. During 1994, Colorado,68 Illinois,69 Indiana, 0 and
Kentucky71 all passed similar laws. So far in 1995, Arkansas,72
Idaho,73

Kansas,74

Virginia,79

and

Minnesota,75

Wyoming 0

Mississippi,76

Texas,77

Utah,7 8

have passed similar bills, and twenty-

65. S. 582, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3801 (1995).
66. See supra note 64.
67. 1993 Or. Laws 422 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (Supp. 1996)).
68. 1994 Colo. Legis. Serv. 304 (West) (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-25-126.5 (Supp. 1996)).
69. 1994 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 88-690 (West) (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
415, para. 5/52.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996)).
70. 1996 Ind. Legis. Serv. P.L. 1-1996, § 18 (West) (codified at IND. CODE
§§ 13-28-4-1 to 13-28-4-10 (Bums 1996)).
71. 1994 Ky. Acts 430 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994)).
72. 1995 Ark. Acts 350 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to 8-1-312
(Michie Supp. 1995)).
73. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 359 (codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 to 9-811
(Supp. 1996)).
74. 1995 Kan. Sess. Laws 204 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3332 to
60-3339 (Supp. 1995)).
75. 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 168 (West).
76. 1995 Miss. Laws 627 (codified at MIss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (Supp.
1996)).
77. 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 219 (Vernon) (codified at TEx. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (West Supp. 1996)).
78. 1995 Utah Laws 304 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to 19-7109 (1995 & Supp. 1996)).
79. 1995 Va. Acts 564 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to 10-11199 (Michie Supp. 1996)).
80. 1995 Wyo. Sess. Laws 58 § 1 (codified at WYO. STAT. § 35-11-1105
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one other states have introduced environmental audit or immunity
bills.81 Early this year, the New Jersey State Senate also passed a
privilege bill. 2
V.

CONCLUSION

Until a policy is promulgated on the state and federal levels,
environmental audits will not be completely safe. The concern that
environmental audits will be used against the company doing selfassessment has caused fewer audits than necessary to be undertaken
voluntarily. Alternatively, the findings and conclusions in some
audits are sanitized, reducing their usefulness. It appears clear that
legislation is needed and stands a good chance of passage. With
many states establishing audit privileges, EPA is under pressure to
keep pace. When such legislation passes, states like New Jersey
will dramatically change their treatment of audit privileges.

(Supp. 1996)).
81. Paula C. Murray, The Environmental Self-Audit Privilege: Growing Movement in the States Nixed by EPA, 24 REAL ESTATE L.J. 169, 171 (Fall 1995). For
a thorough compilation of all state environmental audit privilege bills passed or at
least sponsored nationwide, see States Taking Legislative Initiative in Encouraging CorporateAudits, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) (Mar. 15, 1995).
82. S.B. 384, 207th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996).

